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1. Introduction
The theoretical proposition that temporarily below-normal tax rates on
labor this year, when merged with the prospect of reversion to normal rates
next year, will encourage households to squeeze more work into this year and
to work less in future years is well-founded. This proposition was recently
tested anew on Icelandic data and performed well empirically (Bianchi, Gud-
mundsson and Zoega (2001)). But would a permanent cut in tax rates on
∗This paper will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book, Edmund S. Phelps and
Hans Werner Sinn, 2009, eds., The Performance of Continental Economies, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. I am grateful to Ned Phelps for the lessons I have learnt from our long
collaboration upon which this paper builds. I also thank Pentti Kouri for his comments
on the first version of this paper.
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hthoon@smu.edu.sg; tel: (65)-6828-0248; fax: (65)-6828-0833.
1
labor encourage more work permanently—with no diminution of effective-
ness? Conversely, does a permanent increase in tax rates on labor cause a
permanent decline in hours worked?
Recently, Prescott (2004) argued that the substantial decline in labor
supply of French, Germans and Italians in the past three decades could be
fully explained by the increase in their effective marginal tax rates on labor.
(Americans today work 50 percent more than their counterparts in the Big
Three Continental countries although Europeans worked more than Amer-
icans in the early 1970s.) Using a neoclassical model of labor supply, he
argued that the divergence in relative hours worked between Americans and
Europeans over the three decades or so could be quantitatively accounted for
entirely by the difference of marginal tax rates on labor without appealing to
differences in preference for leisure or subjective rate of time discount. His
quantitative model, however, assumed zero international capital mobility, an
assumption that might be questioned given the lowering of barriers to in-
ternational capital flows between Europe and America since the late 1960s
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). A central result we obtain in this paper is that
in a world of perfect international capital mobility, the country that raises
its payroll tax rate does indeed contract employment initially. However, a
reduced take-home pay rate also has negative effects on saving and thus on
wealth next year and beyond. In the long run, wealth could tend to decrease
in the same proportion as after-tax wages. As it is the after-tax wage relative
to non-wage income from wealth ratio that determines the optimal number
of hours supplied to the market (Hoon and Phelps (1996) first derived this
relationship), and that ratio is pinned down by the common world interest
rate, the number of hours worked is equalized across countries in the long run
if preferences are identical.1 Therefore, payroll taxes alone cannot explain
1Hoon and Phelps (1996) explored the consequences of substituting payroll taxes for
VAT and showed long-run neutrality in a small open economy but non-neutrality in a
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cross-country differences in employment over the long run.
We must proceed cautiously, however. If the payroll tax increase were
used to finance government transfers—social assistance and social insurance,
which constitute social wealth—instead of government purchases, the gradual
decrease in private wealth is unable to fully offset the increase in social wealth
even if the external rate of interest is exogenously given. Then the after-tax
wage to income from both private and social wealth suffers a permanent
decline so the reduction in labor input has a permanent component. The
issue is an empirical one.
Faggio and Nickell (2006) have also questioned the adequacy of an ex-
planation about the American-European work difference based on labor tax
differences by pointing out a puzzle. Although the Scandinavian countries
(Denmark, Finland and Sweden) have increased their marginal tax rates on
labor every bit as much as the Big Three Continental countries, their labor
input has not declined by as much over the past three decades and is now
only about 10 percent below that in the Anglo-Saxon countries. From the
perspective of our theory, the long-term differences in hours worked among
Continental Europe, the Scandinavian countries, and America must be due
to differences in time and leisure preferences or the relative importance of
social wealth in these countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. As a pedagogic device,
section 2 develops the textbook model of the effects of labor taxes on leisure
and hours worked. Section 3 then develops the general-equilibrium dynamic
model of the small open economy. Section 4 studies a large open economy
that has an influence on the external rate of interest. Concluding remarks
are in section 5.
large open economy. They explored the fiscal consequences in two types of labor market:
a neoclassical one as well as one with an endogenous natural rate of unemployment derived
from labor turnover.
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2. The Textbook Model
To understand the role played by wealth adjustment in offsetting the neg-
ative effect of labor taxes on labor supply, it is helpful to review the textbook
model. In this model, the representative household maximizes U(C, L¯ − L)
subject to C + vh(L¯ − L) = vhL¯ + yw, where C is consumption, L¯ is the
fixed time endowment, L is the number of hours worked (so L¯−L is leisure),
vh is hourly after-tax wage and yw is unearned income, that is, income from
private wealth. Note that vhL¯ is the potential wage earning if all the time
endowment is devoted to paid work in the market and is called the full wage
income.
In the standard exercise, an increase in the payroll tax reduces vh, hold-
ing other things constant, including the unearned income yw. The fall in vh
produces the standard income and substitution effects. If the latter effect
dominates, which we take to be the case here, the increase in marginal tax
rate on labor income discourages labor supply. In terms of Figure 1, the
household moves from the initial equilibrium point E1 to E2. This, how-
ever, is only the initial impact of higher payroll taxes. As the household’s
take-home pay is reduced, personal savings fall and wealth decumulates. As
unearned income, yw, gradually falls, the budget line (with a gentler slope
reflecting the reduced hourly after-tax wage) shifts toward the origin. Could
the unearned income fall so as to fully restore the number of hours worked,
that is, to move the household to point E3? To answer this question, we
need a general-equilibrium model that endogenizes the process of wealth ac-
cumulation. We set out to do this in the next two sections, handling first
the case of a small open economy that takes the external rate of interest as
given and then the case of a large open economy whose asset accumulation
has an influence on the external rate of interest.
3. The Small Open Economy
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Following Prescott (2004), our focus will be on an individual’s choice of
his time spent in market work, without substantive interest in the choice
between non-market housework and time for leisure. However, in working
with a model with overlapping generations as described in Blanchard (1985),
we face the possibility of some individuals who live forever having a rising
consumption profile over their lifetimes even when the economy is in a steady
state.2 Such individuals who live forever and become very rich in this model
may want to retire from the workforce thus making it difficult to aggregate
across generations. To preserve the tractability of the Blanchardian model
despite endogenizing the work-leisure choice, we therefore want to obtain an
economy where every individual alive has an incentive to spend a positive
(though variable) number of hours in the market sector.3 This explains our
modelling choice described in the next paragraph.
We explicitly model the choice of time spent in three activities: the mar-
ket sector, non-market housework, and leisure. Building upon Benhabib,
Rogerson and Wright (1991), suppose that the utility function is given by
U = log Cˆ + A log[L¯− lm − ln] +B, if lm > 0
= log Cˆ + A log[L¯− lm − ln], if lm = 0,
where A, B > 0 and Cˆ ≡ [Cem + Cen]1/e, e ≤ 1. Here, lm is time spent
2The reason we do not use an infinitely-lived representative agent model as in Prescott
(2004) is that applying such a model in a world economy with perfect international capital
mobility leads to national wealth being degenerate. To obtain non-degenerate wealth in
the open economy, we can either use the Blanchard-Yaari model where all individuals face
a constant and identical probability of death or a model of overlapping and unconnected
infinitely-lived families as in Weil (1989) and Obstfeld (1989). Our results in this paper
carry through if we adopt the Weil-Obstfeld characterization of demographics instead of
the Blanchardian characterization.
3Since Prescott (2004) focuses on the choice of market work at the intensive rather
than the extensive margin, the representative agent always supplies a positive number of
hours to the market sector.
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working in the market sector, ln is time spent in non-market housework, Cm
is consumption of the market good, and Cn is consumption of the home pro-
duced non-market good. We assume that the non-market good is produced
according to Cn = snln; sn > 0. Notice that as in Benhabib, Rogerson and
Wright (1991), we suppose that working in the market sector gives positive
direct utility, presumably because one enjoys certain social interactions and
mental stimulus at work that are especially valued. We assume that there is
a fixed positive utility value from working in the market sector (given by B)
that is independent of the actual number of hours worked. In contrast, the
utility value derived from housework comes indirectly from consuming the
home-produced good generated by the time input into the non-market sector.
Making the further assumption that the direct utility value from spending a
positive amount of time in the market is sufficiently large, in particular, that
(A+ 1)[log L¯− log(L¯− 0+)] < B,
we ensure that every living person in the economy spends a positive amount
of time working in the market.4 Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991)
show that solving out for non-market housework, ln, we end up, in the Cobb-
Douglas case with e = 0, the following reduced-form utility function:
logCm + (A+ 1) log(L¯− lm) + B.
The production structure of the economy is described as follows. There
are two market goods: one internationally traded and the other a non-traded
good. The internationally traded good, following Obstfeld (1989), is a Solow
good that can be used either for consumption or for addition to the capital
4A very wealthy individual who might have chosen to retire in a model without a pos-
itive utility value from market work spends a very small positive amount of time working
in the market (lm = 0+) given the positive utility value of market work compared to
housework in our model.
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stock. The non-traded good is a pure consumption good. We choose the
traded good as numeraire.
Demographics are described as in Blanchard (1985). Agents face an in-
stantaneous probability of death θ that is constant throughout life. We now
leave out them subscript used earlier to index market good and market work,
understanding that, using the reduced-form utility function (having solved
out for ln and Cn), we refer now only to market goods and time spent in
market work. Let c(s, t) denote consumption at time t of an agent born at
time s, l(s, t) the number of hours worked in the market, w(s, t) non-human
wealth, and h(s, t) human wealth. Note that c(s, t) ≡ cT (s, t) + pcN(s, t),
where cT (s, t) is consumption of the traded good, cN(s, t) is consumption of
the non-traded good and p is the relative price of the non-traded good. Also
let yg(s, t) be entitlement received and vh(s, t) be the after-tax real hourly
wage (both measured in units of the traded good), where vh is related to
the hourly labor cost to the firm, vf , by vf ≡ (1 + τ)vh, τ being the payroll
tax rate. We make the assumption that workers of all age cohorts have the
same productivity, face the same tax rate and receive the same entitlement
so vh(s, t) = vh(t) and yg(s, t) = yg(t) for all s. We let r(t) denote the
real instantaneous short-term interest rate and ρ(> 0) the pure rate of time
preference.
The agent maximizes∫ ∞
t
{log[(cT (s, κ))γ(cN(s, κ))1−γ]+(A+1) log(L¯−l(s, κ))+B} exp−(θ+ρ)(κ−t) dκ,
subject to
dw(s, t)
dt
= [r(t) + θ]w(s, t) + vh(t)l(s, t) + yg(t)− c(s, t)
and a transversality condition that prevents agents from going indefinitely
into debt. The solution to the agent’s problem, after using two-stage bud-
geting, is given by
c(s, t) = (θ + ρ)[h(s, t) + w(s, t)],
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L¯− l(s, t)
c(s, t)
=
A+ 1
vh(t)
,
where human wealth is given by
h(s, t) =
∫ ∞
t
[l(s, κ)vh(κ) + yg(κ)] exp−
∫ κ
t
[r(ν)+θ]dν dκ.
Aggregating across all individuals, dropping the time index t and denoting
per capita aggregate variables by capital letters, we obtain
C = (θ + ρ)[H +W ], (1)
(A+ 1)C
L¯− L = v
h, (2)
H˙ = (r + θ)H − (Lvh + yg), (3)
W˙ = rW + Lvh + yg − C, (4)
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. We note that although
every worker faces the same hourly pay, the fact that the members of the
labor force are of different ages means that their wealth levels are different,
and consequently, the number of hours worked will be different across the
different age cohorts.
The government is assumed to run a balanced-budget policy and, for sim-
plicity, we set government debt to zero. The government budget constraint
can be expressed as
τLvh = yg +G, (5)
where G ≡ GT+pGN is the per capita level of government purchases, and tax
revenue collected is from payroll taxation. Assuming that domestic residents
own all the capital stock, K, and assuming free international lending and
borrowing, W ≡ K + F , where F is the holding of net foreign assets. (Res-
idents can always borrow from abroad to achieve this portfolio allocation.)
Taking the time derivative of (1), and using (3) and (4), we obtain
C˙ = (θ + ρ)[rW + (r + θ)H − C]. (6)
8
Using (1) in (6), we obtain, after re-arrangement of terms,
C˙
C
= (r − ρ)− θ(θ + ρ)[K + F ]
C
. (7)
Let us now lay out the conditions satisfied by the production side of
the economy. We assume that the non-traded good is the relatively labor-
intensive good.5 For simplicity, we suppose that producing a unit of the non-
traded good requires Λ−1N units of labor. The traded good constant-returns-
to-scale production function is given by F (K,LT ), where LT is employment
in the traded-good sector. Profit maximization gives
vf = pΛN = f(kT )− kTf ′(kT ), (8)
r = f ′(kT ), (9)
where kT ≡ K/LT , f ′(kT ) > 0; f ′′(kT ) < 0.
From (8), we see that kT is positively related to p and in conjunction with
(9), p = φ(r); φ′(r) < 0. For the small open economy, r = r∗(exogenously given) >
0. Consequently, the relative price of the non-traded good is pinned down
by the external rate of interest. To determine the domestic stock of capital,
we use the market-clearing condition for the non-traded good sector:
(1− γ)C
p
+GN = ΛN [L− K
kT
]. (10)
The pure case of government purchases with no transfers
To understand the long-run effects of labor taxes, it is convenient to first
focus on the steady state before turning to the dynamics. In a steady state
with no government transfers, aggregate human wealth, H, equals vhL/(r +
5Obstfeld (1989) notes that empirical evidence gives support to the assumption that
non-tradables, taken as an aggregate, are relatively labor-intensive compared to tradables
and cites Kravis and Lipsey (1983).
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θ). Non-human private wealth is given by K + F so nonwage income (or
unearned) income from private wealth is given by yw = (r+θ)(K+F ), which
takes the form of annuity income, θ(K + F ) being the component called the
actuarial dividend. Using these relations and (1) in (2), and rearranging, we
obtain the steady-state labor-supply relation in manhours:
L
L¯
=
1− (A+ 1)
[
θ+ρ
r+θ
] (
vhL¯
yw
)−1
1 + (A+ 1)
[
θ+ρ
r+θ
] . (11)
We also note that in a steady state, (7) can be expressed as
r = ρ+ θ
 1
1 +
(
vhL¯
yw
) (
L/L¯
)
 . (12)
Suppose that the government now finances increased purchases (∆G) by
raising payroll taxes. The key result from (11) and (12) is that with the
interest rate pinned down by the exogenously given external rate, r = r∗,
(vhL¯/yw) and L/L¯ are determined independently of the payroll tax rate, τ .
Hence, an increase in the payroll tax rate is neutral for employment in the
long run.
The economic logic underlying the neutrality result is as follows: Since
the external interest rate pins down the demand wage offered by the firm, vf ,
the after-tax wage vh ≡ vf/(1 + τ) is reduced one-for-one by the increase of
labor taxes. In the long run, however, unearned income from private wealth,
yw, falls by the same proportion so as to leave the wage to nonwage income
ratio unchanged. Hence labor taxes raised to finance government purchases
are neutral for employment in the long run. In effect, government purchases
end up crowding out private consumption one for one.
To understand the dynamics, it is useful to note from (2) that labor supply
is uniquely pinned down by C˜ ≡ C/vh. We write L = µ(C˜);µ′(C˜) < 0. Using
10
(7), we can write in terms of C˜,
˙˜C
C˜
= (r − ρ)− θ(θ + ρ)[K + F ]
C˜vh
. (13)
The evolution of private wealth is dictated by
K˙ + F˙ = r[K + F ] + [µ(C˜)− C˜]vh. (14)
Noting that r = r∗, and that vh is pinned down by r∗ and the value
of τ , (13) and (14) give us a pair of dynamic equations in C˜ and K + F ,
with the latter being a state variable. We assume that r∗ > ρ so that, in
steady state, the representative household owns a positive level of wealth.
The phase diagram in Figure 2 shows that we obtain saddle-path stability.
Figure 3 shows the dynamic response of the economy to a sudden permanent
increase in the payroll tax rate, τ , which reduces vh, used to finance gov-
ernment purchases. Recalling that labor supply is inversely related to C˜, we
see that the maximum contraction in employment occurs initially. However,
as private wealth gradually declines, employment recovers until in the new
steady state, employment is exactly back to where it was before the policy.
A sudden permanent increase in payroll tax rates therefore produces a tem-
porary contraction of employment with the negative effect of higher payroll
tax rates diminishing to zero as wealth decumulates.
Increase in payroll taxes to finance government transfers
In a steady state, aggregate human wealth, H, now equals (vhL+yg)/(r+
θ), which includes the component, yg/(r + θ) (the present discounted value
of the stream of government transfers), that can be thought of as social
wealth. Non-human private wealth is given by K + F so non-wage income
(or unearned) income from private wealth is given by yw = (r + θ)(K + F ).
Using these relations and (1) in (2), and rearranging, we obtain the steady-
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state labor-supply relation in manhours:
L
L¯
=
1− (A+ 1)
[
θ+ρ
r+θ
] (
vhL¯
yw+yg
)−1
1 + (A+ 1)
[
θ+ρ
r+θ
] . (15)
We also note that in a steady state, (7) is now expressed as
r = ρ+ θ
(
yw
yw + yg
) 1
1 +
(
vhL¯
yw+yg
) (
L/L¯
)
 . (16)
Suppose that initially yg and τ are both zero. Figure 4 illustrates the
effect of raising payroll taxes to finance a positive level of government trans-
fers. Given r = r∗, we note from (15) that L/L¯ is positively related to
vhL¯/(yw + yg) so we obtain the positively-sloped line in Figure 4. On the
other hand, given r = r∗, (16) gives us a hyperbola. The increase in payroll
taxes used to finance yg has the effect of shifting inward the hyperbola along
an unshifted labor supply curve. The result is that there is a permanent de-
cline in vhL¯/(yw+yg). In this case, the decline in income from private wealth
in response to reduced take-home wage fails to offset the increase in income
from social wealth (yg) so the reduction in employment has a permanent
component.
4. The Large Open Economy
It might be argued that if we consider a simultaneous increase in the
payroll tax rate in each of the Continental European economies, it might
be more appropriate to think of a large open economy whose dissaving is
likely to affect the world interest rate. In this section, we extend the anal-
ysis to a large open economy. If payroll taxes raised to finance government
purchases and transfers lead to a tightening of private savings, and the in-
creased borrowing in the international capital market leads to an increase in
the world interest rate, will the after-tax wage to unearned income ratio be
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permanently reduced? Taking the pure case of government purchases with
no transfers, we suppose that as the large economy increases the stock of
private wealth (K + F ), it acts to lower the real rate of interest, that is,
r = R(K + F ); R′(K + F ) < 0 with an interest elasticity (defined with
a positive sign) that we assume is less than one. We first determine what
happens to the long-run rate of interest in response to the increase in labor
taxes.
Setting ˙˜C = 0 in (13) gives
C˜ =
θ(θ + ρ)(K + F )
vh[R(K + F )− ρ] (17)
and setting K˙ + F˙ = 0 in (14) gives
C˜ − µ(C˜) = (K + F )R(K + F )
vh
. (18)
Substitution of (K + F )/vh in (18) using (17) gives us[
C˜ − µ(C˜)
C˜
]
=
R(K + F )[R(K + F )− ρ]
θ(θ + ρ)
, (19)
where we note that the lefthand side of (19) is increasing in C˜ and the
righthand side is decreasing in K + F . We plot this relationship as the
downward-sloping schedule in Figure 5.6 Note from (17) that we have a
positively-sloped schedule that we also plot in Figure 5. The intersection
gives the initial equilibrium C˜ and K + F , and hence the initial steady-
state rate of interest. At given K + F , we see from (17) that an increase in
the payroll tax rate lowers vh and so shifts up the positively-sloped schedule.
Consequently, an increase in the payroll tax rate raises the real rate of interest
in the long run, increases C˜, and thus decreases employment.
6Notice that in the case of a small open economy taking the external rate of interest
as given, this line is horizontal.
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To recapitulate, an increase in the payroll tax rate in a large open economy
such as Continental Europe leads, in the long run, to a decline in European
employment so the higher marginal tax rate does have a permanent negative
effect on employment. The reason is that the dissaving that is brought about
by reduced take-home pay raises the world interest rate, which prevents
private wealth from falling enough to restore the after-tax wage to non-wage
income ratio back to its original level. This does not imply, however, that
another country, say America, with unchanged (lower) payroll tax rates will
have higher employment. In fact, if preferences, including the subjective
rate of time preference, and mortality rate are identical and there is no
hindrance to the cross-border mobility of capital so each country faces a
common world interest rate, the fiscal shock in Europe acts also to contract
American employment by the same amount in the long run. The economic
mechanism producing this result is that wealth accumulation in America
(which runs a current account surplus) that is stimulated by the higher world
interest rate brought about by European dissaving leads to a decline in the
wage to non-wage income ratio in America. In fact, with both America and
Europe facing the common world interest rate, (11) and (12) shows that,
given r, there is an equalization of the employment rates in the long run
despite different payroll tax rates.
Studying the dynamics is now straightforward. Setting r = R(K + F )
in (13) and (14) and using the factor-price frontier relationship making vf a
decreasing function of r, we can study the economy’s response to an increase
in payroll taxes used to finance government purchases. The adjustment path
in response to a sudden permanent increase in τ is shown in Figure 6. The
impact of the labor taxes on employment is greatest initially, and wealth
decumlation once again leads to diminishing negative effects of higher pay-
roll taxes although there is now a permanent negative component as world
interest rate is pushed up.
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One result in the large open economy case is noteworthy. Suppose that the
government purchases child-care services, which we regard as a non-traded
good and thus relatively labor-intensive, and pays for it with higher payroll
taxes. The model suggests that as savings decline and the economy ends up
borrowing from the international capital market and pushes up the world
interest rate, child-care services become relatively cheaper in terms of the
traded good. The reason is that the higher interest rate means that wage
costs (vf ) faced by the firm are lowered. As child-care services are relatively
labor-intensive, their relative price declines.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proved the proposition that a permanent increase in
payroll taxes used to finance government purchases in a small open economy
that takes the external rate of interest as given is neutral for employment in
the long run. However, if the economy in question is large in the sense that
an increase in its borrowing in the world capital market pushes up the world
interest rate, the neutrality breaks down. In the large open economy case,
the higher world interest rate, in lowering the after-tax wage to unearned
income ratio, reduces permanently the number of hours supplied. This does
not mean, however, that the other economies in the integrated world economy
with lower payroll tax rates have higher employment. As these economies run
current account surpluses, stimulated by the higher world interest rate, their
wage to non-wage income ratios fall causing the number of hours worked
in the low-payroll-tax economies also to decline. If preferences are identi-
cal across countries, there is an equalization of employment across countries
despite differences in payroll tax rates. Different marginal tax rates on la-
bor, therefore, cannot explain long-run differences in hours worked across
countries if capital is internationally mobile.
Does our model provide a resolution to the Faggio-Nickell puzzle that
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despite higher labor taxes in both the group of Scandinavian countries (Den-
mark, Finland and Sweden) and the Big Three Continental countries, labor
inputs fell far more in the latter than in the former over the past three
decades? Can one argue that the Scandinavian countries can be safely re-
garded as small open economies with little influence on the world interest
rate so payroll taxes are neutral whereas the Big Three Continental coun-
tries have market power in the world capital market so that payroll taxes are
non-neutral in the long run?
If the Scandinavian countries and the Big Three Continental countries all
operate in an integrated international capital market, the resultant higher
world interest rate brought about by reduced savings in the latter would
have an effect on the former through the interest channel. The higher world
interest rate lowers the after-tax wage to unearned income ratio and hence
reduces labor supply in the Scandinavian countries through the international
capital-market linkage.
From the point of view of the theory developed here, two routes are
open to explain the Faggio-Nickell puzzle. If a higher proportion of payroll
tax revenues is used to finance government transfers in Continental Europe
compared to the Scandinavian countries, then total hours worked will be
lower in the former than in the latter despite every country facing a common
world interest rate. Another hypothesis that has to be explored is whether
the relatively high employment in the Scandinavian countries despite high
marginal labor taxes is due to superior “entrepreneurial” institutions and
economic culture that are represented here by different values of preference
parameters.
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Figure 1: Textbook Model
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Figure 3: Dynamic Response
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Figure 4: Government Transfers
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Figure 5 : Steady-State Effect in Large Open Economy
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